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THE SPECTRE OF ATTAINDER IN NEW YORK*
V.

FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION
IN

1789 TO 1830

Federal and State Constitutions
As we have previously observed, the New York Constitution adopted at Kingston, April 20, 1777, in Article XLI
had provided: "that no acts of attainder shall be passed by
the legislature of this state, for crimes other than those committed before the termination of the present war; and that
such acts shall not work a corruption of blood." s15We have
seen that this provision was of no aid to the loyalists, nor
even to that group of Americans who loved their country
and desired to remain neutral, as, for example, in the case
of the distinguished lawyer, Peter Van Schaack, yet were
not willing to commit treason against the British Crown.
The Federal Constitution contained three provisions
having a bearing on our topic.'8 6 Article III, Section III,
Clause 2, provided that "No Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of
the Person attainted." Article I, Section IX, Clause 3,
provided that "No Bill of Attainder or Ex Post Facto
law shall be passed," and Article I, Section X, Clause
A.

1, provided that "No state shall . . . pass any Bill of
* Published in two parts. Part 1 was published in Vol. XXIII, No. 1,
November 1948.
185 1 Laws of New York 14 (1789).
186

For a discussion of the adoption of the attainder provisions of the Con-

stitution in the Constitutional Convention of 1789, see
STiTUTioN, pp. 733-739, Chicago (1910).
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Thus the prohibition as to the exercise

of this device of tyranny was made good both as against the
State and the Nation, and even in a case of treason corruption of blood was not to extend beyond the life of the person
attainted.
With the relevant provisions of the state and federal
constitutions in mind, as well as the provisions of the Treaty
of Peace of 1783,'18 we may now proceed to consider the cases
growing out of the forfeiture and attainder acts, but which
arose after the adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1789.
B.

Decision8 Involving Constitutional, Statutory
or Treaty Provisions
1.

English Decisions

88
Since Mostyn v. Fabrigas,1
the general rule has been

that transitory as opposed to local causes of action could be
sued upon in any court having personal jurisdiction of the
defendant, without regard to where the cause of action arose.
In practice, however, for various reasons, exceptions to the
rule have been made. One of the exceptions, to use the words
of Chief Justice Marshall, is that "The Courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another .... ,, 189 Two earlier English cases 190 arose out of the Revolutionary War and the
Peace Treaty of 1783, by which the United States Government undertook to guarantee British subjects who owned
property in America from further confiscation of the same
under existing attainder laws of the several states. One of
these cases, Folliot v. Ogden, 19 1 involved New York, and is
of significant interest as revealing the viewpoint of the English government and courts as to the validity of confiscations
187 The pertinent provisions of the Treaty of 1783 are set out in the text,
ante pp. 33-34.
1s 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774).
18 9 See The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123, 6 L. ed. 268, 282 (U. S. 1825).
See also article by Leflar, Extraterritorial Eaforcement of Penal Claims,
36 HAgv. L. REv. 194-225 (1932).
190 Wright v. Nutt, 1 H. Bi. 136, 126 Eng. Rep. 83 (1788) ; Folliot v. Ogden,
1 H. B1. 123, 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (1789), aff'd, 3 T. R. 720, 100 Eng. Rep. 825
(1790); Ogden v. Folliot, 4 Bro. P. C. 111, 2 Eng. Rep. 75 (1792).
191 1 H. B1. 123, 126 Eng. Rep. 75 (1789).
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of property in New York under the Attainder Act of 1779,
and in view of the Treaty of Peace in 1783.
The facts in the case were that the plaintiffs, Richard
Morris and Lewis Morris, and the defendant were inhabitants of the United States of America, while those states were
still colonies of Great Britain, and before the War broke out
between the two countries. In that situation, Richard
Morris and Lewis Morris executed a bond to the plaintiff
Folliot, Ogden signing as surety for the obligation. During
the War and after the Declaration of Independence by the
Congress, both parties were attainted, their property confiscated and vested in the respective states, New York and
New Jersey, of which they were inhabitants, by the legislative acts of those states, and a fund was provided for the
payment of the debts of the defendants. The defendants
having failed to perform, the plaintiff, Folliot, brought an
action of debt in the Court of Common Pleas, at Westminster,
against the defendants. The defendants pleaded that by the
Acts of Attainder in New York and New Jersey, the plaintiff's title to the bond had been cut off, hence that he could
not maintain the action. Two issues were thus prescribed:
1. Whether, under the circumstances of the case, the
plaintiff had a right to sue? The answer to this first question was held to turn on the effect of the New York Act of
Attainder of 1779 upon the plaintiff. As to this the court
observed that these Acts having been made by persons or
states in a state of rebellion at the time, were null and void.
Nor was their invalidity cured by the Treaty of Peace. It
could not ratify those acts which were performed by Americans while in a state of rebellion, and at a time when the
British Crown was seeking to restore them to obedience.
Nor could the Treaty confirm such Acts, or the attainder of
the loyal subjects of the Crown. Accordingly, if the bond of
the plaintiff had been signed by the people of New York, it
could not have had the effect of depriving the plaintiff of his
right of action, before any acknowledgment of the lawfulness
of the power making it. The court ruled further that as the
bond was not signed, as it was never divested out of him, and
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he was still possessor of it, nothing could prevent his suit
upon it in England.
2. Whether, under the circumstances, the defendant
was liable to be sued in England on a bond made in America?
This depended on whether the defendant could establish
as a defense his own attainder in New Jersey, and the confiscation of his property. As to this the court held that the
New Jersey Act of Attainder did not disable the plaintiff
from suing nor exempt the defendant from being sued in
England. Nor was it a good plea in bar that an ample fund
was provided out of the effects of the defendant for the payment of his debts, to which the plaintiff might or ought to
have resorted, and been paid, although- it might constitute
ground for relief in equity. This judgment on writ of error
to the King's Bench, was affirmed, 19 2 but on an entirely different ground, to wit, on the theory that the New York
Attainder Act of 1779, passed after the Declaration of Independence, and before the Treaty of Peace, by which England acknowledged the independence of the colonies, was to
be considered as a nullity in the English courts. The real
ground of the decision was that the penal laws of one country
could not be given effect in another. To the plaintiff's action
on the bond, the defendant had pleaded that, by the penal
laws of New York and New Jersey, the property in the bond
had been divested, and cut off. To this contention the court
replied that the Acts of New York and New Jersey being
penal in character, were unenforceable in England, hence
such action was a nullity and was powerless to affect the
laws and rights of the citizens of England. This decision
in turn was affirmed by the House of Lords on February
25, 1792.193
In the second case, Dudley o. Folliot 194 a covenant in a
conveyance of lands in America, executed during the War of
the Revolution, that the grantor had a legal title, and that
the grantee might peaceably enjoy, without interruption of
3 T. R. 720, 100 Eng. Rep. 825 (1790).
Bro. P. C. 111, 2 Eng. Rep. 75 (1792).
194 3 T. R. 585, 100 Eng. Rep. 746 (1790).
192

1934
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the grantor and his heirs, or by any other person, was held
not to be broken by the act of New York seizing the lands
as forfeited for an act done prior to the conveyance. This
was held to be true in spite of the subsequent acknowledgment by England of the independence of New York, as such
a covenant did not extend to the act of wrongdoers, but only
to persons claiming by a legal title.
Finally, in Kempe v. Antil, 95 in which the former attorney and Advocate General for the province of New York
in North America, sought to restrain an action in England
on a bond, because the creditor had failed to satisfy his claim
out of his estate which had been confiscated under the forfeiture acts of New York and New Jersey, an injunction was
refused. Accordingly, the original plaintiff was paid.
2.

New York Statutes and Decisions
a. Statutes
(I)

Act of March 3, 1789

The Act of March 3, 1789,196 provided that, since no person was permitted to benefit under the Act of July 12, 1782,
unless he had taken the oath of allegiance and obtained a
certificate signed by twelve respectable persons, and since the
word "two" had been substituted in place of the word
"twelve," and certificates had been accepted by certain creditors, the receipts therefor were to be deemed to have extinguished the debt. And in all cases where proceedings had
been prosecuted to judgment of preclusion against certain
creditors, and certificates had not been received, interest was
to be discharged for the period between January, 1776 and
May 1, 1786. Any remainder of money due was to be authorized to be paid in three installments.

1952 Bro. C. C. 11, 29 Eng. Rep. 6 (1785).
Comtra: Wright v. Nutt,
3 Bro. C. C. 326, 29 Eng. Rep. 562 (1791).
18 This Act was entitled, "An Act to give Relief respecting Debts due to
Persons formerly within the Enemy Lines." 2 Laws of New York, c. XLIX,
p. 470 (1789).
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Act Abolishing Forfeitures and Corruption
of Blood (1796)

By the Act of March 26, 1796,197 it was provided that no
conviction or attainder of any person for any offense except
treason, should work a forfeiture of chattels or lands, as well
as forfeitures in the nature of deodands and in the case of
suicide. This, in effect, abolished forfeiture and corruption
of blood as known at common law in England.
(III) Act Barring Actions as to Forfeited Estates (1797)
The statutory phase of the story was now rapidly drawing to a close. Thus, we find that the Act of March 28,
1797,198 barred all claims against forfeited estates if not
prosecuted within five years after the passing of the act,
with a proviso as to infants, femme coverts, and insane
persons.
(IV)

Act on Civil Death (1799)

By the Act of March 29, 1799,199 it was provided that
persons convicted of a felony thereafter should be deemed
to be civilly dead to all intents and purposes. Apparently,
this was only declaratory of the common or existing law,
the enactment being "for greater caution." 200
(V) Treason Act (1801)
On March 20, 1801, the legislature passed a new treason
statute providing for attainder where any person levied war
against the people of the state within the state, or adhered
to the enemies of the state, giving them aid or comfort in the
state, or elsewhere. 20 1 In such case forfeiture or chattels
197 See "An Act making Alterations in the Criminal Law of this State, and
for erecting State Prisons." 3 Laws of New York, c. XXX, p. 291 (1797).
198 This Act read: "An Act limiting the Period of bringing claims and
Prosecutions Against Forfeited Estates." 1 Laws of New York, c. LII, p. 162

(2d 9ed. 1807).
19 See Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. 228 (N. Y. 1820).
200 Id. at 246.
201 The Act was entitled, "An Act relative to Treason," 1 Laws of New
York, c. XXIX, § 1 (2d ed. 1807).
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and lands was provided for, but the attainder was not to be
of the offender, or as forconstrued as corrupting the blood
20 2
feiting the dower of his wife.

(VI) Outlawry Act (1801)
The Act of March 21, 1801,203 provided the process of

outlawry for the personal actions of account, debt, annuity,
covenant, conspiracy, case and replevin, but such outlawry
was not to work any disability 2or
0 4 forfeiture in favor of any
other person than the plaintiff.
(VII) Act for Discovery of Forfeited Lands (1803)
On March 31, 1802,205 a statute was made to facilitate
the discovery and sale of estates of attainted persons, and it
gave twenty-five per cent of the estate to the person making
the discovery. It also permitted the person found in possession to purchase the land so discovered.
(VIII) Statute Abolishing Writs of Attaint
Upon Untrue Verdicts
And finally, on April 5, 1813,20 6 a statute abolished attaints upon untrue verdicts as a method of controlling the
jury, thus for all practical purposes bringing to an end the
statutory chapter on attainder.
b. Decisions
(I) Purchaser's Claim for Rent Against Seller in Possession
Under Attainder Act-Sleight v. Kane (1801)
In the earliest New York case of leight v. Ka/ne,20 7 the
facts were that the defendant, Kane, a British subject, re202 Id. at §§ 9, 10.
The Act was entitled, "An Act for regulating Outlawries," 1 Laws of
New York, c. LI, pp. 246-250 (2d ed. 1807).
203

204 On March 24, 1801, "An Act for the Relief of Debtors with respect to
the Imprisonment of their Persons," 1 Laws of New York, c. LXVI (2d ed.

1807):

205 This Act was entitled, "An Act to facilitate the Discovery and Sale of
the Estate of Attainted Persons," 3 Laws of New York, c. LXXXII, p. 47
(1804).
206 1 Laws of New York, c. XL, § 27, p. 358 (1807).
2072 Johns. Cas. 236 (N. Y. 1801).
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siding in Dutchess County, on December 17, 1777, purchased
a farm and dwelling house from Sleight in the Town of Fishkill for £2,400, giving a note for part of the consideration,
it being agreed that Sleight, the intestate, should remain in
possession during the war, at a reasonable rent. Thereafter,
the defendant took refuge on August 1, 1777, behind the British lines in New York City, where he remained until November 25, 1783, when he evacuated with the British Army, not
returning to the State until September 1, 1793. On August
4, 1784, the plaintiff sued on the promissory note for £100,
payable on demand. The defendant, in addition to other defenses, claimed a set-off for rent due from December 17, 1777
to October 20, 1779. On October 22, 1779, the Legislature
had declared "for the forfeiture and sale of the estate of
persons who have adhered to the enemies of the State," by
which act the defendant was by name convicted and attainted, his real and personal property on that day being
forfeited to and vested in the State of New York." The issue
therefore was whether the rent claimed by the defendant
could be set-off against the defendant's demand?
The court, in holding for the plaintiff, said that although
the note was given as consideration for the farm, the retention of its possession by the plaintiff was not a condition of
the purchase, hence there were two distinct transactions.
Accordingly, the defendant's claim for rent was merely a
chose in action, and, as personal property, was transferred
under the forfeiture act to the people, as also was his right
to the real estate, the consideration for the rent failed.
Therefore he could neither maintain an action for it, nor
set it off by way of defense.
Finally, it was said: "The Treaty of Peace does not
affect this case."
(II)

Attainder of Plaintiff as Defense to Action
of Ejectment-Jackson v. Sands (1801)

The next case, Jackson ex dem. St. Croix v. Sands,20 8
was also decided in 1801 under the Act of Attainder and
2082

Johns. Cas. 267 (N. Y. 1801).
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Banishment of October 22, 1779. The facts were that in an
action of ejectment it was proved that the lessor of the plaintiff, by the name of Joshua Temple De St. Croix, was seized
of the premises in question from the year 1776 to 1782. The
defendant offered in evidence a record of conviction of
Joshua De St. Croix, dated July 15, 1783, by which it appeared that he had been indicted and attainted, and his real
and personal property forfeited to the State. The defendant
also gave in evidence a deed from the Commissioners of Forfeitures, dated May 18, 1786, which stated that they had been
"forfeited to the people of the state of New York by the Conviction of Joshua T. De St. Croix." The lessor's name of
baptism was proved to be Joshua Temple. An offer by defendant, to prove that the lessor was known by the name of
Joshua De Croix, was objected to, but overruled. Several
witnesses testified that they knew the lessor was generally
called Joshua De St. Croix, as mentioned in the record of
conviction, and Joshua T. De St. Croix, named in the deed
to the defendant, were one and the same person. The court
also directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant,
if they believed them to be one and the same person. A verdict having been returned for the defendant, a motion to set
aside the verdict, and for a new trial, was made.
The issue thus presented was whether the variance in
the name between the record of conviction, and the deed, was
sufficiently material to be fatal to the plaintiff's case?
The court took the view that even if the variance in the
record were fatal, it was not so as to the deed, for there it
appeared not as evidence of the person convicted, but as a
part of the description of the premises conveyed, hence was
subject to explanation by proof. Noticing a procedural distinction between those cases in which the person was attainted by name in the act and in those attainted by the procedure prescribed under the act for those not named, the
court concluded that in both instances the attainder was
legislative in character, hence not subject to common law
rules of construction in the ordinary case. On the contrary,
said the court, an attainder by statute being a high and
vigorous act of sovereignty, and defendable only as necessary
to public safety or national policy, the act was to be con-
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strued liberally according to its true intent. So construing
it, and relying upon the authority of a case in Foster's
Reports, 0 9 the court concluded the description of the lessor
was merely incomplete in point of form, and not repugnant
to the truth, hence evidence could not be received to show
that the identity of the person named in the record of conviction and in the deed were one and the same, and it followed that that being so, the plaintiff was precluded from
recovery of the forfeited estate. Moreover, observed Kent, J.,
by the Act of May 19, 1784,210 any error in the proceedings
relating to prior forfeitures or confiscations were ratified and
confirmed. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the defendant. Apparently, this case presented no issue under the
Treaty of 1783.
(III) Attainder of Grantee as Defense to an Action
of Ejectment-Jackson v. Catlin (1807)
The next case, Jackson ex dem. Gratz v. Catlin.,211 decided in 1807, involved an action of ejectment. The facts
were that the land in question was originally owned by one
Croghan against whom William Peters secured a judgment
for debt. This was followed by a sale at public auction in
July, 1774, to Thomas Jones, afterward a judge of the
Supreme Court of New York, and a deed was executed on
November 9th following, in favor of Jones, the purchaser,
but delivered to James Duane, 212 as an escrow, to be delivered
to Jones upon payment of the purchase money. On October
22, 1779, Thomas Jones was attainted of the offense of adhering to the enemies of the state, thus forfeiting "all his
estate, both real and personal, held or claimed by him,
whether in possession, reversion or remainder, and also all
estates and interests claimed by executory devise or contingent remainder."
The issue thus raised was whether, in an action of ejectment by the heirs of the lessor of the plaintiff, Croghan, could
2 09

Grantham v. Gordon, 1 P. Wms. 612, 24 Eng. Rep. 539 (1719).
Laws of New York, c. LXX, p. 159 (1789).
2112 Johns. 248 (N. Y. 1807).
212 Doubtless this was the same James Duane who presided over the case of
Rutgers v. Waddington in 1784.
210 1
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succeed against the defendant Catlin, who claimed under a
transfer made by the Surveyor-General, acting under the authority of the Act of March 21, 1788,213 authorizing a transfer
of the interest of Jones, who had been attainted by the Act
of October 22, 1779.
The determination of this issue turned on a secondary
issue as to the nature of the estate which the defendant acquired, or the nature of the estate which Jones acquired when
the deed was delivered in escrow. Was it an estate vested
in possession, reversion, remainder, by executory devise, or
contingent remainder, or was it an estate on condition?
If the latter, then no interest vested in Jones, and
through him, the defendant.
The court held, Justice Kent delivering the opinion, that
the delivery of the deed in escrow, until the condition was
performed, did not transfer the legal title to the purchaser
Jones, that the Act of Forfeiture did not apply to estates
upon condition, hence upon the attainder of Jones, the estate
of the lessor of the plaintiff did not vest in the people of the
State; and that the State could not, by paying the money,
perform the condition, so as to make the deed, delivered in
escrow, absolute, and thereby vest the estate in the person
attainted; and that the only effect of the State's transfer
was that of a quitclaim deed.
In reaching this conclusion Justice Kent pointed out
that at common law no condition, use or mere right of action,
was forfeited to the King, upon attainder of treason even
though such attainder reached the lands and tenements.
This, apparently, was the rule under the English Statute of
2 15
Treasons, 2 14 a defect which was cured by a later statute,
which declared uses, entries and conditions, as well as possessions, reversions and remainders should be forfeited upon
attainder. Since then, observed Chief Justice Kent, the only
issue has been whether the condition was personal and inseparable from the person attainted, or could be performed
by the Crown. Comparing the language of the Act of Oc2132

Laws of New York, c. XC, p. 372 (1789).

214 25 EDw. III, c. 2 (1351).
21533

Has. VIII, c. 20 (1541-42).
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tober 22, 1779, to the language used in the English Statute
of 26 Hen. VIII, c. 13 (1534), the court found the language
of the latter as broad as that used in the state act, and then
pointed out that such language was not regarded as including a condition. Accordingly, it required the express words
of the Statute of 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20 (1541-2), to embrace
those cases. Even in the face of the amendment the court
said the language of the statute had been strictly construed
where a question of the forfeiture of conditions was involved,
citing the Duke of Norfolk's case 218 which held a personal
condition not forfeitable; Englefield's case,21 7 permitting a
nonpersonal condition to be performed by the Queen, only
later to be confirmed by statute, 21 8 because of doubt. Accordingly, said the Chief Justice, whether viewed from the
standpoint of the common law, or the decisions since the
statute of 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20 (1541-2), the attainder of
Jones did not vest in the state any right to pay the purchase
money and take legal title to the land. It followed that the
heirs of Croghan, the lessor of the plaintiff, still held title
to the premises, unless the sale by the Surveyor-General
alienated this right. As to this, the court observed that the
Act of March 22, 1788, being a private act, and without a
saving clause, did not bring strangers within its purview,
but only those whose consent was obtained. 219 It was for
this reason that the Act merely directed the SurveyorGeneral to execute a deed with a clause of warranty. Therefore the deed was good against no person except the state;
it was a mere quitclaim of whatever right or interest the
state had. As it did not declare the sale a bar to Croghan's
claim, there was no issue as to the constitutional validity of
the statute. The Act in question, finally observed the court,
was passed under a misapprehension of the rights of the state
resulting from the attainder of Thomas Jones, and at the
suggestion of William Peters, who held the judgment against
Rep. Ch. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1683).
Co. Rep. lb, 77 Eng. Rep. 428 (1591).
See also Wardner v. Hardwin, Latch. 102, 82
218 35 ELIZ., c. 3 (1592-3).
Eng. Rep. 295 (1625-28); Smith v. Wheeler, 1 Mod. 38, 86 Eng. Rep. 714
2163
217 7

(1670).

219 The court cited as authority: Boswell's Case, 25 & 26 ELIZ., cited in
Barrington's Case, 8 Co. 136B, 77 Eng. Rep. 681 (1611).
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Croghan, for the purpose of transferring the interest of the
state whatever it might be. The Treaty of 1783 was in no
way involved.
(IV) Right of Mortgagee in Possession to Set Up Mortgage
Against State as Successor to Attainted MortgagorJackson v. Pierce (1813)
The case of Jacksan ex dem. The People v. Pierce, decided in 1813,220 also involved an action of ejectment. The
facts were that Weatherhead, on March 2, 1773, executed a
mortgage deed to Thomas Warnold and others of Leeds,
Great Britain, to secure the payment of a bond. On March
3, 1803, the mortgage was assigned to Thurman. In the
meantime, by the Act of October 22, 1779, Weatherhead had
been attainted, and went to England, and on March 29, 1802,
upon petition by the occupants of the land in question, the
Attorney-General and Surveyor-General reported that there
was a sum of six thousand dollars or more due on the mortgage, and advised the State against redeeming the mortgage,
suggesting a sale subject to the mortgage. The land in issue
was not settled or inhabited until 1786, and the mortgage
debt had laid dormant from April, 1774 to March, 1802. The
issue thus presented was whether the defendant in possession
under the mortgagee could set up the mortgage against the
state, as having succeeded to the rights of the mortgagor,
who had been attainted? The court held that a mortgage
given by the attainted mortgagor, Weatherhead, could be set
up against the state. The case is only interesting as showing
the unexpected difficulties which arose once the policy of
attainder was embraced and as showing further how long
it was to take for the effects to die out.
(V) Effect of Issuance of Writ of Scire Facias to One Civilly
Dead in Suit to Quiet Title-Troup v. Wood & Sherwood
(1820) and Platner v. Sherwood (1822)
The case of Troup v. Wood and Sherwood 221 is not directly related to our topic, but has an indirect bearing be220 10 Johns. 414 (N. Y.
2214 Johns. Cb. 228 (N.

1813).
Y. 1820).
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cause it involved the application of the Act of March 29,
1799, which declared that a person convicted thereafter of
any felony should be deemed to be civilly dead to all intents
and purposes. The plaintiff, seeking to quiet title to his
premises, was holding under Henry Platner, who had been
convicted of forgery, and under the amendment to the civil
death statute of March 29, 1799, which reduced the punishment from death to imprisonment for life, and provided that
no such conviction should work a forfeiture of property real
or personal, contended that the writs of scire facias issued
to one civilly dead, and not to his personal representatives,
could have no legal operation or effect in reviving a judgment against him. The court, Chancellor Kent presiding,
so held.
The next case, Platnerv. Sherwood,= decided in 1822,
was a sequel to the case of Troup v. Wood, in which Platner,
still seeking to quiet title, stated that in 1783, being indebted
to Abraham Bachman, he executed a bond to secure the debt,
that in 1787 judgment was entered in the Supreme Court for
the penalty of the bond, that he made a final settlement with
Bachman, and got a receipt, but no satisfaction of the judgment was entered on the record, that in 1799, he was indicted,
tried and convicted of a forgery committed before March 29,
1779, that he was sentenced to life imprisonment, and later
pardoned, that at the time of said conviction he owned several lots of land in the military tract, that after his conviction Bachman acquired the receipt, and revived the judgment, and that his lands were accordingly sold on execution
of the judgment, wherefore he prayed that the defendant be
decreed to quiet the plaintiff in his title, to account for the
rents and profits, and for general relief.
The defendant Sherwood demurred to the bill on the
ground that it appeared by the bill that plaintiff was divested
of his estate by the conviction, attainder and imprisonment
stated in the bill, that he had not been restored thereto,
hence he was not required to answer thereto.
The court overruled the demurrer and ordered the defendant to answer.
2226

Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1822).
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The effect of this was to hold that a person convicted
and attainted of felony and sentenced to imprisonment for
life, prior to March 20, 1799, the date of the act creating
civil death, was not civilly dead, hence his estate was not
divested. It follows logically that the plaintiff was entitled
to have his title quieted.
(VI) Statute Barring From Public Office Persons Convicted
of Duelling as Violation of Constitutional Prohibition
Against Attainder-Barker v. New York (1823)
The case of Barker v. The People of the State of New
York 223 is only of negative interest, holding that the Act
of November 5, 1816, to suppress duelling, and declaring any
person convicted of challenging another to fight, should be
incapable of being elected to any post of profit, trust or
emolument, civil or military, under the state, was constitutional and did not involve the federal constitutional
prohibi2 24
tion against the enactment of a bill of attainder.
(VII) Attainder of the Plaintiff's Ancestor as a Defense to
a Writ of Right to Recover Land Occupied by Tenants
as Owners-Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor (1830)
Inglis, Denandant v. The Trustees of the Sailor's Snug
Harborin the City of lew York 2 25 which arose in New York,
and was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York, evidently because it was
concerned with the rights of a New York and a foreign citizen, was the first New York case, since Rutgers v. Waddington, to raise serious issues under the Treaty of 1783,
and is of considerable significance as shedding a light on
developments in New York long after the close of the War.
The facts were that the plaintiff brought a writ of right
to recover certain real estate located in New York City,
whereof Robert Richard Randall died seized. The count was
3 Cow. 686 (N. Y. 1823) ; affirming 20 Johns. 457 (N. Y. 1823). "
Two cases, Hartung v. The People, 22 N. Y. 95 (1860), and Shepherd
v. The People, 25 N. Y. 406 (1862), sometimes referred to as involving problems of attainder, are omitted, as in reality they are concerned with ex post
facto laws.
225 3 Pet. 99, 7 L. ed. 617 (U. S. 1830).
223
224
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upon the seizin of Robert Richard Randall, and went for the
whole premises, as his brother and sister who both survived
him, had since died without issue. The plaintiff traced his
relationship to Robert Richard Randall, through Margaret
Inglis, his mother, who was a descendant of John Crooke,
the common ancestor of Robert Richard Randall, Catherine
Brewerton and Paul R. Randall. The tenants put themselves upon the grand assize, and the mise was joined upon
the mere right.
At the trial evidence was offered to show that the tenants, in possession for a number of years, were holding the
land as owners, that Robert Richard Randall who was seized,
had purchased from one Baron Poelnite; that the plaintiff
was the next collateral heir of Robert R. Randall on the
part of his mother, and that the blood of Thomas Randall,
father of Robert Richard Randall, was extinct. It was also
in evidence that the British troops entered New York
on September 15, 1776, under authority of the British
Commander-in-Chief, that the plaintiff, Inglis, was born in
New York City and was not then more than one year old,
that the plaintiff's father, a native of Ireland, resided in New
York and continued to do so until the day before, or the day
of evacuation on November 25, 1783, at which time the plaintiff was taken to England, that the father later went to Nova
Scotia, where he died, that the mother of the plaintiff died
in New York on September 21, 1783, before the evacuation of
British troops, that Charles Inglis, the father of plaintiff,
had always been considered a royalist, that the plaintiff was
born before the year 1779, that in 1783 he could not speak
plainly and was considered not more than five years old, that
he resided in Nova Scotia with his father, and had continued
there ever since, that Charles Inglis had four children, the
eldest of which, a son, died in infancy, on January 20, 1782,
two daughters, and the plaintiff, who was the youngest child.
It further appeared that on July 16, 1776, the Members
of a New York State convention, prior to the entry of the
British into New York City, Resolved:

".

.

. that all persons

abiding within the State of New York, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said
laws, and all members of the state; and that all persons pass-
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ing through, visiting, or making a temporary stay in said
state, being entitled to the protection of the laws, during the
time of such passage, visitation, or temporary stay, owe,
during the same, allegiance thereto. That all persons, members of, or owing allegiance to, this state, as before described,
who shall levy war against the said state, within the same,
or be adherent to the King of Great Britain, or others, the
enemies of the said state, within the same, giving to him or
them aid or comfort, are guilty of treason against the state,
and being thereof convicted, shall suffer the pains and penalties of death."
The tenants then gave in evidence acts of the legislature
of New York "for the forfeiture of the estate of persons who
adhered to the enemies of the state," passed October 22,
1779 ; 226 and the supplement thereto, passed March 27, 1783.
Robert Richard Randall died in New York City between
June 1 and July 1, 1801, leaving a will, which was duly

probated.
The provisions of the will, under which the tenants
claimed title, read:
6. As to and concerning all the rest, residue and remainder
of my estate, both real and personal, I give devise and bequeath the
same unto the chancellor of the state of New York, the mayor and
recorder of the city of New York, the president of the chamber of
commerce in the city of New York, the president and vice-president
of the Marine Society of the city of New York, the senior minister
of the Episcopal church in the said city, and the senior minister of
the Presbyterian church in the said city, to have and to hold all and
singular the said rest, residue and remainder of my said real and
personal estate, unto them, the said chancellor of the state of New
York, mayor of the city of New York, the recorder of the city of New
York, the president of the chamber of commerce, president and vicepresident of the Marine Society, senior minister of the Episcopal
church, and senior minister of the Presbyterian church in the said
city, for the time being, and their respective successors in the said
offices for ever, to, for and upon the uses, trusts, intents and purposes, and subject to the directions and appointments hereinafter
mentioned and declared concerning the same, that is to say, out of
226

1 Laws of New York, c. XXV, p. 39 (1789).
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the rents, issues and profits of the said rest, residue and remainder
of my said real and personal estate, to erect and build upon some
eligible part of the land upon which I now reside, an asylum or
marine hospital, to be called "the Sailor's Snug Harbour," for the
purpose of maintaining and supporting aged, decrepid and worn-out
sailors, as soon as they, my said charity trustees, or a majority of
them, shall judge the proceeds of the said estate will support fifty
of the said sailors, and upwards; and I do hereby direct, that the
income of the said real and personal estate, given as aforesaid to my
said charity trustees, shall for ever hereafter be used and applied
for supporting the asylum or marine hospital, hereby directed to be
built, and for maintaining sailors of the above description therein, in
such manner as the said trustees, or a majority of them, may, from
time to time, or their successors in office may, from time to time,
direct. And it is my intention, that the institution hereby directed
and created should be perpetual, and that the above-mentioned officers
for the time being, and their successors, should for ever continue and
be the governors thereof, and have the superintendence of the same.
And it is my will and desire, that if it cannot legally be done, according to my above intention, by them, without an act of the legislature, it is my will and desire, that they will, as soon as possible,
apply for an act of the -legislature to incorporate them for the purposes above specified. And I do further declare it to be my will and
intention, that the said rest, residue and remainder of my real and
personal estate, should be at all events applied for the uses and purposes above set forth; and that it is my desire, all courts of law
and equity will so construe this my said will, as to have the said
estate appropriated to the above uses, and that the same should, in
no case, for want of legal form or otherwise, be so construed, as that
my relations or any other persons should heir, possess or enjoy my
property, except in the manner and for the uses herein above
specified.
And lastly, I do nominate and appoint the chancellor of the state
of New York, for the time being, at the time of my decease; the
mayor of the city of New York, for the time being; the recorder of
the city of New York, for the time being; the president of the chamber of commerce, for the time being; the president and vice-president
of the Marine Society in the city of New York, for the time being;
the senior minister of the Episcopal church in the city of New York,
and the senior minister of the Presbyterian church in the said city,
for the time being; and their successors in office, after them, to be
the executors of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all
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other wills, and declaring this to be my last will and
former and
227
testament.
Immediately upon the testator's decease, and the probate
of the will, the officers named in the will entered upon the
premises as owners in fee, until the legislature of New York
on February 6, 1806, passed "An Act to incorporate the
Sailor's Snug Harbor, in the City of New York," which act
authorized the new corporation to purchase, hold and convey
real estate for the use and benefit of said corporation.
Thereupon, the counsel for the tenants gave in evidence
the legislative act "for the relief against absconding and absent debtors," passed April 4,1786,228 and a report made to
the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New York,
of proceedings under the act against Paul Richard Randall,
by which he was declared an absent debtor. Under this act
the estate of Paul Richard Randall was seized on November
13, 1800, and conveyed on December 22, 1801, to Charles
Ludlow, James Brewerton and Roger Strong, of New York
City, as trustees for the creditors of the said debtor.
Subsequently, the demandant offered in evidence two
rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature; the first., dated
February 17, 1804, ordered that the said Trustees pay to the
said Paul Richard Randall... the sum of $5,500, out of the
money now remaining in the hands of the said trustees; the
second, dated August 9, 1804, vacated the prior rule, and
ordered the said sum of $5,500 ... to be paid over by them
to the said Alexander Phoenix, as the attorney and agent of
the said Paul Richard Randall."
It further appeared that Catherine Brewerton died
about 1815, that Paul Richard Randall died in 1820, that
Catherine Brewerton, while a widow, executed a will on June
5, 1815, devising her estate to her executors upon trust for
uses described in her will.Upon the trial in the circuit court, the judges were opposed in opinion upon the following points, which were certified to the Supreme Court:
227
228

Note 225 supra at 104, 7 L. ed. at 619.
1 Laws of New York, c. LIV, p. 96 (1789).
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1. Whether, as the count in the cause was for the entire
right in the premises, the defendant could recover a less
quantity than the entirety?
As the determination of this issue has little relation to
our general topic, it is sufficient that Justice Thompson, for
229
the majority, answered the question in the affirmative.
This view, after a very exhaustive survey of the common law
and statutory authorities in England and New York and
Massachusetts, was confirmed by Justice Story in his dis230
senting opinion.
2. Whether John Inglis, the demandant, was or was
not capable of taking lands in the State of New York by
descent?
This issue was broken up into four subordinate issues:
A. Whether, in case John Inglis was born before July
4, 1776, he was an alien, and hence disabled from inheriting
real estate?
B. Whether, in case he was born after July 4, 1776 and
before September 15, 1776, at which time the British took
possession of New York, he was under a like disability?
C. Whether, if he was born after September 15, 1776
and before the British evacuation on November 25, 1783,
he was under a like disability?
D. What would be the effect upon the right of John
Inglis to inherit real estate in New York if grand assize
found that Charles Inglis, the father, and John Englis, the
demandant, did elect, in point of fact, to become and continue as British subjects, and not American citizens?
As to this issue, and without discussing each subordinate
issue, Justice Thompson held that if John Inglis was born
before July 4, 1774, he became a British subject, and in the
absence of some subsequent act on his part, continued an
alien, hence was disabled from taking the land in question.
Justice Johnson, of the majority, held that the demandant was in the beginning clearly a subject of the British
22-9 3 Pet.
230 Ibid.

99, 7 L. ed. 617 (U. S. 1830).
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Crown, that by the revolution, that allegiance, under the
principles of common law, adopted by the twenty-fifth article
of the New York Constitution of 1777, was transferred to the
state, that the common law declared that an individual could
not put off his allegiance by his own act, that no legislative
act changing the common law was passed, that the demandant was prohibited by the provisions of the state constitution: the thirteenth article of the act of the constitution
providing that "no member of the state shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured
to the subjects of the state by that constitution, unless by the
laws of the land or the judgment of his peers," and the fortyfirst article declaring that "no act of attainder shall be passed
by the legislature of the state, for crimes other than those
committed before the termination of the present war, and
that such acts [of attainder] shall not work corruption of
blood," hence the second question should be answered in the
affirmative; that is, that John Inglis was entitled to inherit
as a citizen born in the State of New York.
Justice Story, after a survey of the general principles
of the subject of alienage, said that peculiar difficulties developed where a country was divided by civil war. Thus,
while the rule that allegiance due by birth could not be
changed by any act of the subject, but might be by a complete overthrow of the existing government, notwithstanding
the civil war, remained in existence and in active possession
of a part of the country. Accordingly, under such circumstances, the principle adopted was to permit all persons,
whether natives or inhabitants, to elect to remain subjects
of the British Crown, or to become citizens of the United
2 31
States, such choice to be made within a reasonable time.
He then considered the facts and found that, John Inglis'
parents, as early as September 15, 1776, had joined the British troops in New York, and remained under their protection
until the close of the war, that he then withdrew and re231

Cases cited for authority included: Martin v. Commonwealth, 1 Mass.

347 (1805); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 1 Dall. 53, 1 L. ed. 33 (U. S. 1781);
Caignet v. Pettit, 2 Dall. 234, 1 L. ed. 362 (U. S. 1795); Inhabitants of
Manchester v. Inhabitants of Boston, 16 Mass. 230 (1819) ; M'Ilvane v. Cox's
Lessee, 4 Cranch. 209, 2 L. ed. 598 (U. S. 1808).
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mained thereafter under allegiance to the British Crown.
Referring to the Ordinance of July 16, 1776, which declared
"that all persons abiding within the state of New York and
deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance
to the said laws, and are members of the state," by operation
of law, Justice Story said that the word "abiding" did not
mean merely present inhabitancy, but present inhabitance
coupled with an intention of permanent residence. Hence,
he argued that the temporary stay mentioned in the resolution, passed only twelve days after the declaration of independence by Congress and within five days after the adoption
of the declaration by the convention of this state, clearly
indicated that those persons resident here without a permanent intention to remain, were not to be regarded as members of the state. Pointing out that the Attainder Act of
1779, which named the parents of the demandant, and that
hence they were absolved of allegiance, and that this was
the status at the close of the war, Justice Story therefore
concluded that John Inglis was born and remained a subject
of Great Britain unless it could be shown he was born between July 14, 1776 and September 15, 1776, the date of the
British occupation of New York.
3. Whether the will of Catherine Brewerton was sufficient to pass her right and interest in the premises in question, so as to defeat the demandant; the premises being, at
the date of the will and ever since, held adversely by the
tenants in this suit?
Mrs. Brewerton was the sister of Robert Richard
Randall, and in the event the devise in his will was void,
and could not take effect, she, as one of his heirs, was entitled
to a moiety of the lands. It appeared that she died in 1815,
leaving a will by which she devised her real and personal
estate, in law and equity, in possession, reversion, remainder
or expectancy, unto her executors, upon certain trusts
therein described. If this will was operative so as to pass
her right to her brother's estate, the demandant's right to
recover would be defeated as to one-half of the land.
The operation of the will was objected to on the ground
that the premises at the time were held adversely by the
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tenants in the suit. The validity of this objection turned
2 32
upon the construction of the New York Statute of Wills,
or on the issue as to whether the owner of lands could devise
land, which at the time of the devise and his death, was held
adversely. More specifically, the question was whether a
person having a right of entry had an estate by inheritance
in lands within the meaning of the statute of wills. In answer to this question Justice Thompson held that Mrs. Brewerton had a right of entry, which was devisable, notwith23 3
standing it was held adversely by the tenants in the suit.
Justice Story, who dissented, agreed with the majority conclusion on this third issue.
4. Whether the proceedings against Paul R. Randall,
as an absent debtor, passed his right or interest in the lands
in question to, and vested the same in, the trustees appointed
under the said proceedings, or either of them, so as to defeat
the demandant?
Paul R. Randall died in 1820 and he and his sister,
Mrs. Brewerton, were the heirs at law to the estate of their
brother, Robert Richard Randall, hence if the will of Mrs.
Brewerton passed her right, Paul R. Randall was entitled to
the other moiety; if not, he was entitled to the whole of his
brother's estate. The determination of this issue turned
upon whether a right of entry passed under the provisions
of the Absconding Debtor Act.2 34 This depended on whether
the term "estate," as used in the Act, extended to the interest
which the debtor had in the adversely held lands. Justice
Thompson found that the language of the Act was broad
enough to include a right of entry, hence the estate of the
debtor, under the New York statute, vested in the trustees
by operation of law, without any assignment.
Justice Story, on this point in his dissent, held that the
proceedings against Paul R. Randall did not pass his right
or interest in the lands so as to defeat the demandant, basing
this conclusion on the common law rule that the word
232
233

1 N. Y. Rev. Laws 364, § 1.
The authority relied upon was Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 237 (N. Y.

1827).
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1 N. Y. Rev. Laws 157.
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"estate" did not include a right of entry,235 plus an analysis
of the New York statutory provision designed to show that
they never were intended to cover rights of entry. Accordingly, he concluded that the right of entry of Paul R. Randall
did not pass to the trustees under the absconding debtor
statute. But, said Justice Story, even if they did, and all the
trusts had been satisfied, there was a resulting trust to him
in the unsold estate.
5. Whether the devise in the will of Robert Richard
Randall of the lands in question, was a valid devise, so as
to divest the heir-at-law of his legal estate, or to affect the
lands in his hands with a trust?
This question arose under the residuary clause of the
will, under which the testator declared that as to the residue
and remainder of his estate, he gave, devised and bequeathed
the same to the Chancellor of the State of New York, and
several persons in official positions, to have and to hold unto
them and their successors in office, for ever, upon such trusts,
and subject to the directions and appointments mentioned
in the will, to erect on some part of the land upon which he
resided, an asylum or marine hospital, to be called "The
Sailor's Snug Harbor," for the purpose of supporting aged,
decrepit and worn-out sailors. If this could not be legally
done without an act of the legislature, he directed the trustees to apply for an act of the legislature to incorporate them
for the purposes stated above. He then declared it his will
to have his property so used, and stated it was his desire to
have all courts of law and equity to construe his will in such
a way as to prevent his relations or any other person from
possessing or enjoying his property, except in the manner
and for the uses specified.
Within five years after the death of the testator, the
legislature of New York State, on application of the trustees,
passed a law constituting the persons holding the offices
designated in the will, and their successors, a body corporate,

235
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by the name of the "Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor,"
and enabling them to execute the trusts declared in the will.
Justice Thompson held this to be a valid devise, to divest
the heirs of his legal estate, or at all events, to affect the
lands in his hands, with the trust declared in the will. His
theory was that the intention of the testator had to be carried
out in view of the unequivocal declaration of the testator,
that if that intention could not be precisely carried into
effect, the testator had provided in the alternative, which,
with the aid of an act of the legislature, would remove every
difficulty. Distinguishing the case of Baptist Association V.
Hart's Ewecutors 23 6 from the instant case, the Court said
that there the bequest was void because of the uncertainty of
the devisees, hence the property vested in the next of kin, or
was disposed of by some other provision of the will. If, said
the Court, the testator had bequeathed to the Baptist Association, subject to its thereafter becoming incorporated, within
a reasonable time, there would have been little doubt but
that the subsequent incorporation would have conferred on
the association the capacity of taking and managing the
fund. In the instant case, however, said Justice Thompson,
there was no uncertainty as to the individuals who were to
execute the trusts. Nor could there be any objection to
this as a valid executory devise, which is a disposition of
lands, where no estate vests at the death of the devisor, but
only upon a future contingency. In substance Justice Johnson agreed with Justice Thompson, basing his conclusion on
a long survey of the scope and effect of the Statute of Charitable Uses. 237 Justice Story, dissenting, and with the concurrence of Chief Justice Marshall, held that the devise, if
valid, was not such as to divest the heir at law of his legal
estate; that the devise could have effect only as a trust for
a charity fastened on the legal estate in the hands of the
heir.
The next effect of this decision was to hold that in determining the allegiance of the demandant, or of one born in
this country, the rule as to the point of time at which such
236 4 Wheat.
237 43 ELiz.,

1, 4 L. ed. 499 (U. S. 1819).
c. 4 (1601).
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person elected was, under American law, the Declaration of
Independence; under British law, the Treaty of Peace in
1783. Accordingly, the demandant left before the Declaration because of the attainder of his parents, and having not
returned, became an alien, incapable of inheriting lands by
descent.
With the close of this case, it may be said that the forces
of tyranny which had been given full vent in the Attainder
Act of October 22, 1779, had run its full course, the forces
having spent itself only after a period of fifty-one years.
VI.

FROM 1830 TO THE; CIVIL WAR

Between the Inglis case and the Civil War the spirit
of attainder, long prevalent throughout the land, appears to
have been quiescent. The nearest approach to it may be
found in the two cases of Hartung v. The People of the State
of New York,2 3 and Shepherd v. The People of the State
of New York, 2 3" both of which involved laws alleged to
operate ex post facto.
VII.

THE DOCTRINE

OF ATTAINDER AS

APPLIED TO THE TEST

OATH CASES ARISING OUT OF THE) CIVIL WAR

A.

General Background of Problem

Prior to the Civil War the federal courts were not called
upon to consider the constitutionality of either state or federal legislation as amounting to a bill of attainder. Cases
had reached the Supreme Court involving the interpretation
and application of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace of
1783 to the colonial statutes of attainder. 24 0 But at the very
beginning of the Reconstruction period following the conclusion of the Civil War, several cases arose which involved the
validity of "test-oaths," which were imposed either by Congress or by state legislatures during the period of Reconstruction. These statutes required as a condition precedent,
2382

N. Y. 95 (1860).
(1862).
Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U. S. 99, 7 L. ed. 617 (1830).

23925 N. Y. 406
240 See Inglis v.
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any person seeking to vote, hold office, or participate in certain professions or occupations, to take an oath that he had
never participated in the rebellion against the United States.
Either membership in the Confederate Army, sympathy with,
or aid to the forces of secession, were within the purview of
these statutes.
The first cases arose out of a federal statute requiring
attorneys petitioning to practice before the federal courts to
take an oath of both past and present loyalty to the Government of the United States. 241 The first of these cases, In re
Shorter,2 42 decided by the Alabama District Court in December, 1865, held an act of Congress unconstitutional as
amounting to a bill of attainder, as an invasion of the court's
inherent jurisdiction over the admission, regulation and expulsion of attorneys, where the act required an oath of
]oyalty of attorneys petitioning to practice before the courts
of the United States. The District Court of Tennessee, in
January, 1866, in In re Baxter,2 43 reached a similar conclusion, without saying whether the statute was a bill of attainder or not. In Ex parte L&W', 44 the Georgia District
Court held the act void as a bill of attainder. Shortly thereafter the same state of facts reached the Supreme Court in
Ex parte Garland,2 45 considered with Cwmmings v. Missouri,24 6 and which arose under the test-oath law involved
and which operated as a punishment for past acts committed
against the Government of the United States, and as the act
made no provision for trial prior to the time of the infliction
of the punishment, it was in substance a bill of attainder. In
so finding, the Court treated the Missouri constitutional
provision, in the Cummings case, as similar to the act of
Congress.
Dissenting vigorously, Justice Miller argued that the
act was not a bill of attainder, as it lacked the necessary
element of punishment, and was only an expression of the
241

12 STAT. 502 (1862), repealed, 23 STAT. 22 (1884).

22 Fed. Cas. 16, No. 12,811 (D. C. Ala. 1865).
2 Fed. Cas. 1043, No. 1,118 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1866).
244 15 Fed. Cas. 3, No. 8,126 (D. C. D. Ga. 1866).
245 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366 (U. S. 1867).
246 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356 (U. S. 1867).
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state's sovereign power to protect its people against an unlimited right of suffrage. Moreover, said the Justice, the
disfranchisement by deprivation of suffrage of any portion
of the citizens of a state, was not at common law regarded
as passing a bill of attainder, hence he argued, no such effect
ought to be given to the act of Congress in the Missouri constitutional provision. This dissent was in accord with the
24 7
view expressed in the Missouri case of Blair v. Ridgeley,
and the Murphy and Glover Test Oath cases.248
B.

The Situation in New York--Gree v. Shum'way (1868)

It is against this background that the next development
in the New York case of Green v. Shunway 249 must be
viewed. The facts were that the plaintiff, seeking to vote
in a lawful election on April 23, 1867, was denied the privilege because he refused to take the test oath as required by
the Act of March 29, 1867.250 The act declared that no person shall vote at the election for delegates to said convention,
who will not, if duly challenged, take and subscribe, an oath
that he had not done certain acts mentioned therein, and
inflicted the penalty of political disfranchisement, without
any preliminary trial for a refusal to take said oath. The
New York Court of Appeals held, Justice Miller writing for
the majority, that such a statutory provision violates both
the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against bills
of attainder.
By the statute, said Justice Miller, the citizen was deprived of a right guaranteed by the Constitution; to deprive
one of the elective franchise for past conduct, inflicted upon
him a penalty, which by the law of the state, was a part of
the punishment for a felony, and which followed upon conviction for such a crime. The practical effect of the test oath
required by the act deprived the citizen of equality with his
neighbors in the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges.
The Constitution, said Justice Miller, sought to prevent the
24741
24841

Mo. 63 (1867).
Mo. 340 (1867).

24939 N. Y. 418 (1868).
250 Laws of N. Y. 1867, c. 194.
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exercise of such power of the legislature by usurpation of
the judicial function, and for the punishment of alleged
offenders in advance of trial, for offenses unknown to the
law, by its prohibition of attainder both as to state and
nation. Justice Miller also held that the act violated the
state constitution, to wit, Article I, Section 2, providing for
submission of the questions whether a convention should be
called to the electors qualified to vote for members of the
legislature. Article I, Section 1, which declared that "no
member shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured the citizens thereof, unless by the
law of the land, or the judgment of his peers; Article I, Section 6, providing that no person should be held to answer for
a crime, except on presentment of a grand jury, and the second section of the same article, which secured the right of
trial by jury in all cases in which it had theretofore been
held inviolate. In reaching these conclusions Justice Miller
relied for authority upon Cunangs v. The State of
MiSSOur

251

and Ex parte GarZwnd.2 5 2

Justice Mason dissented, arguing that the power to regulate the elective franchise had not been delegated to the
United States, that the passage of the act requiring a test
oath was not in conflict with the federal constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder by the states, as this provision was adopted against the common law background of
attainder, and that so understood, it had never had any relation or reference to regulating the elective franchise.
Accordingly, the Justice declared:
The disfranchising, by depriving of the right of suffrage ...
was never in any country regarded as passing bills of attainder
against them, and no such effect can be given to this clause of the
Constitution, without doing violence to its language and pushing it
by a farcical construction, beyond the well recognized and received
impact of the word "employed."
In short, Justice Mason felt that the test oath was not
imposed as punishment, but was imposed as a part of the
state's sovereign power to protect its citizens from the dan251
252

See note 246 supra.

See note 245 supra.
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gers alleged to be lurking in the doctrine that the2 5right
of
3
suffrage was an unqualified right of every citizen.
VIII.

ATTAINDER AND CiviL DEATH

The next case, Avery v. Everett, 54 involved civil death,
not as an incident of attainder but as a result of a conviction of felony and a sentence to life imprisonment, under the
New York statute providing that such a person should be
deemed to be "civilly dead to all intents and purposes in the
law." In this situation the testator devised his real estate
to his wife, for life if she remained unmarried, and upon her
decease or marriage, to C, his son; in case of the death of C
without children, the remainder to A, another son. The wife
survived the testator, and after her death C, who at the time
was unmarried and without children, was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment
in the state prison. The plaintiff, claiming under A, brought
an action of ejectment, while C was still living.
The issue thus presented was whether such a death was
contemplated by the testator, and whether the words of limitation were to be construed as applying to a civil, or only to
the natural death of C?
The court held that the title of C was not divested as a
result of his sentence to imprisonment for life; hence the
grantee of A, the plaintiff, had no present interest upon
which to maintain ejectment.
Andrews, J., speaking for the majority, traced the history of the problem at common law and found that prior to
253 In accord with the dissent, see Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865);
State v. Neal, 42 Mo. 119 (1868); Randolph v. Good, 3 W. Va. 551 (1869);
Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 585 (1884) ; Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 595 (1894).
254 The next case in order of time, is Rogers v. Buffalo, 123 N. Y. 173, 25
N. E. 274 (1886), in which it was held that the provision of the Civil Service
Act (Laws of N. Y. 1883, c. 354, § 1, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1884, c. 410),
provided for the appointment by the governor, and the confirmation by the
senate, of three persons as civil service commissioners, "not more than two
of whom shall be adherents of the same party," is not violative of the provision of the State Constitution declaring that "no member of this state shall
be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any
citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers"
(§ 1, art. 1) ; nor is it violative of the provision declaring that no person shall
e "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" (§ 6,
art. 1).
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1799, the incident of civil death attached upon conviction of
a felony, observing that Chancellor Kent, in Troup v.
"Wood,255 entertained no doubt on the matter. The law was
changed thereafter by the Act of March 29, 1799, which provided that in all cases where a person shall be convicted and
attainted of any felony thereafter committed and adjudged
to imprisonment for life in the state prison should be
"deemed and taken to be civilly dead to all intents and purposes in the law." 258 Thereafter, in 1813, the law was revised to read that a person sentenced to imprisonment for
life "shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead," and this provision was subsequently reenacted in the penal code. 2 57
Referring to the relevant decisions, Judge Andrews discussed Troup v. Wood 258 and Platner v. Sherwood,2 5 9 both
of which related to lands once owned by one Platner who,
in June, 1799, was convicted of forgery and sentenced to life
imprisonment, only to be pardoned in 1806. The trial and
conviction took place after the enactment of the Act of March
29, 1799, but the offenses were committed prior thereto. In
the Troup case, the bill was filed by a grantee of Platner,
under a deed executed before his conviction in 1792, to set
aside sales of the same lands, made after Platner's conviction and sentence and during his imprisonment under judgments against him, obtained prior to the complainant's deed.
The Chancellor set aside the sales and titles of defendants,
on the ground that the judgment upon which the executions
issued had been paid prior to the sales thereon, and that the
sales were fraudulent. Moreover, the Chancellor said the
sales were void for another reason, to wit, that the scre
facias to review the judgment against Platner was directed
to his "representatives and to the terre-tenants," he being
civilly dead. The implication was that the Chancellor felt
that a civil death divested the offender's estate, with the
heirs inheriting immediately, as in case of a natural death,
forfeiture and corruption of blood having been abolished by
2554

Johns. Ch. 228 (N. Y. 1820).

256 Laws of N. Y. 1799, c. 57.
257 Derived from PENI.. CODE § 708, Laws of N. Y. 1881, c. 676.
2584
2596

Johns. Ch. 228, 248 (N. Y. 1820).
Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1822).
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the Constitution of 1777, except forfeitures for a limited time
in case of treason.
The second case of Pltner v. Sherwood 260 was brought
by Platner after his pardon, to set aside sales of other lands
made during his imprisonment. The defendant's demurrer
to the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had been
divested of his interest by civil death, was overruled, the
Chancellor, on reconsideration of the law as stated in the
prior decision, holding that at common law that such consequences did not follow upon civil death. Sustaining the bill,
the Chancellor gave as a reason for his prior misapprehension, that the Act of March 29, 1799, in force at the time of
the trial, only applied to offenses thereafter committed. This
suggestion implied that the Act of 1779 changed the common
law. 2 6 1 The effect of the Platnerv. Sherwood. decision was
to hold that civil death, under the common law, did not operate as a divestation of the estate of the convicted felon.
Accordingly, Justice Andrews held the word "death" as used
in the statutes of devolution meant "natural death." The
Justice concluded his opinion by quoting the words of Chancellor Kent, in Platner v. Sherwood: "The penal consequences of attainder must be necessary deductions, severely
required by the premises; and as there was to be no forfeiture
of estate, the law would not be consistent with itself, if it
held the party alive, for the purpose of being sued and
charged in execution, and yet dead as to the purpose of transmitting his estate to his heirs." 262
Justice Earl dissented vigorously, taking the view that
the Act of March 29, 1799, was enacted to remove the uncertainties of the common law, by declaring the person convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment as "in law, dead
and buried"; and such were the views of Chancellor Kent
when he wrote the opinions in Troup v. Wood (4 Johns. Ch.
229) and Platnerv. Sherwood (6 id. 118), and also of the
court in Denning's Case (10 Johns. 232). The slight change
in the phraseology of the second statute was not intended
260 Ibid.
261 See note 256 suPra.
2626

Johns. Ch. 118, 131 (N. Y. 1822).
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to change the scope or meaning of the law. 26 3 Moreover,
observed Judge Earle, the provisions of the act relating to
"absconding, concealed and non-resident debtors" clearly
implied, as Judge Andrews admitted, that the legislature,
when framing that provision, understood that a life convict
was divested of his estates.
So in the year 1888 in the State of New York we have
the spectacle of two judges of the Court of Appeals at opposite ends of the pole when faced with the issue as to whether
civil death, an incident of attainder for treason or felony,
operated to divest the person convicted of a felony and sentenced to life imprisonment, was divested of his estate, under
a proper construction of the statute.
IX.

CONVICTION OF CRIME AS BAR TO PRACTICE

OF PROFESSION

The next development came in Hawker v. New York. 2 64
By an indictment, the plaintiff in error was charged with
having committed the crime of abortion on September 1,
1877. He was found guilty and sentenced, March 6, 1878,
to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of ten
years. In 1895, an amendment to Chapter 661, Laws of New
York of 1893,65 provided that "any person who, after conviction of a felony, shall attempt to practice medicine, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor." Thereafter, the plaintiff in
error was indicted under this statute, for having practiced
medicine, after having been convicted of a felony in 1878,
by "then and there unlawfully medically examining, treating
and prescribing for Dora Hoenig." The defendant's demurrer having been overruled, upon a plea of not guilty, he
was tried, convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $250. This
conviction having been sustained by the Court of Appeals,
he sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
The issue thus raised was whether the New York statute
of May 9, 1893, providing that any person who, after conviction of a felony, shall practice medicine, should be guilty
263 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1822).
264
265

170 U. S. 189, 42 L. ed. 1002 (1898).

Laws of N. Y. 1895. c. 398.
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of a misdemeanor, punishable, upon conviction, by fine or
imprisonment, violated Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, providing that: "No State shall
:. . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
In afflrining the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals, Justice Brewer, speaking for the majority, and in
reply to the plaintiff in error's argument, that he had been
convicted of a criminal offense, and suffered the punishment
therefor, that the legislature had no power to add to that
punishment, that the right to practice medicine was a valuable property right, that to deprive a man of such right was
in the nature of a punishment, and that after he had fully
expiated his offense a statute inflicting an additional penalty
amounting to increasing the punishment for the original
offense, was void as a bill of attainder or an ex post
facto law, held that it was within the acknowledged reach
of the policy power of a state to prescribe the qualifications
of one engaged in a business concerned directly with the lives
and health of the people as the practice of medicine. Thus,
it might require both qualifications of learning and of good
character. Accordingly, if the state regarded one who had
violated its criminal laws as not possessed of a sufficiently
good character, it might deny such person the right to practice medicine, making the prior record of conviction conclusive evidence of the violation of the criminal law and of the
absence of the requisite character. Moreover, the commission of crime, the violation of the penal laws, said Justice
Brewer, had a direct relation to the question of character.
And the fact that the form in which the legislation was cast
suggested the idea of the imposition of an additional penalty
for past conduct was not conclusive. Looking at the substance, the Justice observed that the vital matter was the
violation of the law, not the conviction, the latter being only
the evidence of the former. Analyzing the cases 266 relied
upon by the plaintiff in error, Justice Brewer declared:

266 Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1867); Ex parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867).
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The thought which runs through these cases, and others of
similar import which must be cited, is that such legislation is not to
be regarded as a mere imposition of additional penalty, but as prescribing the qualifications for the duties to be discharged and the
position to be filled, and naming what is deemed to be and what is
26 7
in fact appropriate evidence of such qualifications.
Justice McKenna dissented, declaring that:
If the statute in force when the offense of abortion was committed had provided that, in addition to imprisonment in the penitentiary, the accused, if convicted, should not thereafter practice medicine, no one, I take it, would doubt that such prohibition was a part
of the punishment prescribed for the offense. And yet it would
seem to be the necessary result of the opinion of the court in the
present case, that a statute passed after the commission of the offense
in 1877, and which, by its own force, made it a crime for the defendant to continue in the practice of medicine, is not an addition
to the punishment inflicted upon him in 1878. I cannot assent to
8
this view.26
Justice McKenna distinguished the instant case from
the case of Dent v. West Virgini 69 by pointing out that
the statute in that case merely provided that a license was
a condition precedent to the practice of medicine, whereas
the instant case involved a "state enactment which, by its
own force, made it a crime for any person, lawfully engaged,
when such act was passed, in the practice of the medical
profession, to continue to do so, if he had at any time in his
past life committed a felony, although he may have suffered
all the punishment prescribed for such felony when it was
committed."
Moreover, a requirement of good character as laid down
by the statute should relate to the present status or condition of a person coming within its terms; the act involved
dealt not with present, but past moral character, and was
based upon felonies entirely unconnected with the profession
of medicine. Thus, said Justice McKenna, the act enhances
the punishment of the prior offense by depriving the petitioner of his property right and by preventing his practice
267
268
269

Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 200, 42 L. ed. 1002, 1007 (1898).
Id. at 200, 42 L. ed. at 1007.
129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623 (1889).
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of his profession, because of his past, and in this case expiated crime.
So in 1898, just twelve years before the dawn of the
twentieth century, we have a case, arising in New York,
carried to the Supreme Court, in which the spirit of attainder
was incorporated in a state statute, the validity of which
was of such a doubtful character as to demand a decision by
the highest court in the land, which decision, when delivered,
was by a divided court.
X.

BOUNTY
Riggs v. Palmer (1889)

ATTAINDER AND THE SLAYER'S

A.

The spirit of attainder again makes its appearance in
the field of the problem of the slayer and his bounty. In
New York the earliest case involving this problem was Riggs
v. Palmer 270 in which the Court of Appeals held that the
slayer devisee could not take the legal title of the property
of the murdered testator. This decision raised no issue of
attainder as nothing was being taken from the slayer.
B.

Ellerson v. Westcott (1896)

This holding was subsequently qualified in Ellerson v.
Westcott 271 in which substantially the same court, on essentially the same state of facts, stated that what they really
meant to hold in the Riggs case was that any available remedy lay by way of injunctive relief. This was developed in
the constructive trust theory as a New York solution of the
problem of the slayer and his bounty. Thus, also, was laid
the foundation for the introduction of the attainder element
in the picture.
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy (1918) and In re Santouria's
Estate (1925)

C.

This element is illustrated by two cases. 27 -

The first

115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896), reversing 88 Hun 389, 34 N. Y. Supp.
813 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
270

27148

272 Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,. 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct.
1918) ; In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr.
Ct. 1925), 26 COL. L. REv. 482 (1926).
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case, Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,2 73 involved the right of one tenant
by the entirety who has killed the other in order to take,
decided in 1918 by the New York Supreme Court. This case
held that the slayer should take nothing, and should be entirely excluded, even from the one-half interest of the
profits of the estate, which, under the common law he would
be entitled to enjoy for the period of his life.
The facts in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy were: H and W held
real estate as tenants by the entirety. H murdered W and
immediately thereafter committed suicide. At that time H
was 45 and W was 36 years of age. Y, the executor of
W, and K(1) and K(2), her only heirs, also legatees under
W'0 will, brought suit in equity against X the administratrix
of W, and all the heirs of W, and asked that they be adjudged
owners of the real estate in question in accordance with the
will of W, and that the defendants, and all persons claiming
under them, be enjoined from making or asserting any claims
of ownership to said premises. The complainant further
alleged that the killing was "wilful in order that H might
thereby acquire and possess the real estate above described."
The answer admitted the killing, but denied the intent, and
asked that the defendants be adjudged the owners of the real
estate in question.
In granting the prayer of the complainants, the court
held (1) that no one will be permitted to acquire property
by his own crime; (2) that where, while plaintiff's testatrix
and defendant's intestate were tenants by the entirety of
certain real estate, he murdered her and immediately took
his own life, the executor and heirs at law of the wife will
be granted judgment in an action in equity against the administratrix and heirs at law of the husband adjudging that
the plaintiffs are the owners of the real estate in question
in accordance with the will of their testatrix, even though
there is no evidence that the husband murdered his wife in
order that he might acquire her real estate.
The opinion in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy 74 purports to fol273
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T h as
low the leading New York case of Riggs v. Paier,
76
modified by Ellerson v. Westcott,
that is, it purports to
apply the constructive trust theory against the innocent
heirs of the murderer, and this regardless of the motives of
the wrongdoer, and, also, to hold that this principle applies
to prevent the operation of the statute of descent as well
as a succession by will, thereby repudiating the theory of
In re (arpenter's Estate.27 7
In holding that the constructive trust theory applied
whether death was caused with or without intent to profit,
this case clearly repudiates the case of In re Wof 2 78 But
the court is not clear as to the theory by which the legal title
which passed to H by survivorship, passed to the heirs of W.
It contents itself with a recital of the phrase "that no one
shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his
own iniquity or to acquire property by his own crime." 2 79
Such an explanation is entirely unsatisfactory, and fails to
consider the nature of the estate by the entirety.
The application of the constructive trust theory to the
case where a tenant by the entirety murders his co-tenant,
in the manner in which it was used in the Van Alstyne
case, 280 deprives the heirs of the murderer of any interest
in the property that was so held. Under such a holding the
nature of the estate by the entirety is completely disregarded.
Is it possible to evolve a theory, consistent with established rules of law, which will meet the situation? It seems
clear that such a theory must not ignore the common-law
nature of estates by the entirety; it must prevent the murderer from enjoying any benefits because of his wrongful
act; it must avoid conflict with the constitutional prohibition against corruption of blood and forfeiture of estates;
275
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115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896), reversing 88 Hun 389, 34 N. Y.

Supp. 813 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
277 170 Pa. 203, 32 At. 637, 30 Am. L. Rnv. 130, 41 CENT. L.

J. 377 (1895),
71 MADRAS L. J. 1 (1936).
278 88 Misc. 433, 150 N. Y. Supp. 738 (Surr. Ct. 1914), 28 HARV. L. REv.
426 (1915).
279 115 N. Y. 506, 511, 22 N. E. 188, 190 (1889).
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See note 273 supra.
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it must recognize that the descent of estates, legal or equitable, is immediately cast upon the death of the owner and
cannot be held in abeyance.
The evolution of such a theory must begin with a consideration of the common-law theory of the estate by the
entirety. At common law a conveyance or devise to two
persons who are married to each other at the time of the conveyance creates an estate in entirety. The husband and wife,
as a unity, own the legal title. The four unities of time,
title, interest and possession are present. The right of survivorship exists between them, since the estate belongs to the
unity, and therefore continues in the survivor as the surviving member of the unity. Upon a severance of this fictitious unity of persons by the natural death of either, by
a condition implied in law, the survivor held the legal title,
the deceased leaving no interest which was devisable or
descendable. During the continuance of such estate neither
the husband nor the wife could convey, encumber or destroy
the right of the survivor. Under the common law the husband was entitled to the rents and profits during their joint
lives, which right was an incident of the husband's estate
by the marital right.
Under modern statutes, the nature of the estate remains
the same, but under thq statutes abolishing the husband's
estate by the marital right, the husband and wife are each
entitled to one-half of the rents and profits during their joint
lives.
Now, let us see what the status of the husband and wife,
and their respective heirs'at law or representatives, is before
the wrongful act is committed. Before the wrongful act,
both H and W have a vested interest in the estate, subject to
be divested by the happening of a condition subsequentthe death of one of them leaving the other surviving. Prior
to the happening, the heirs or legal representatives of both
parties have only what may well be called a contingent interest in the entire estate, dependent upon the happening of
the condition subsequent, namely, the divestiture of their
respective ancestor's co-tenant by lawful death. There must
be both a legal divestiture and a legal survivorship in contemplation of the law in order for the ordinary incidents of
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the tenancy by the entireties to attach. Merely outliving
the wife does not satisfy the conditions imposed by the common law; survivorship in law as well as survivorship in fact
is an indispensable requisite, and the decease of the other
co-tenant must be in the ordinary course of events and subject only to the vicissitudes of life, in order for the survivor
to hold the complete ownership, freed from the right of
participation on the part of the decedent or his or her legal
representatives.
Under either the common-law or modern statutory
theory as to the nature of estates by entireties, when H kills
W, he ought-not to be wholly deprived of the rents and profits
to which he was clearly entitled at common law, or the onehalf interest to which, under the modern law, he would be
entitled for the period of his life. If this characteristic of
the estate by the entirety is not overlooked, all danger of
violating constitutional prohibitions against corruption of
blood and forfeiture of estates may be easily avoided, and
the very vital distinction between the divesting of property
and merely denying one's right to inherit is observed. To
prevent a forfeiture, therefore, it must be held that upon
W's death at the hands of H, the legal fee simple must be
allowed to rest in H, for how other can a forfeiture be prevented and H be allowed to enjoy the life interest in the rents
and profits which was a vested interest and which interest
he did not acquire by the murder? This result seems inescapable and takes care of the element of forfeiture in this
type of case.
If our theory stopped at this point, the murderer would
not be prevented from benefiting by his wrongful act; something more must be added. To prevent such a result, the
heirs of W must acquire some interest or right (possibly by
descent) at the very moment of W's death, to which the legal
interest passing to H by his wrongful act, will be subordinated. The acquisition of such a right of interest may be
worked out as follows: W and H originally took the estate
in question subject to a condition implied in law that neither
could destroy the interest of the other; that the possibility
of either holding, not taking, the entire estate, free from the
possibility of participation by the other, by survivorship, was
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dependent upon the natural death of one of the co-tenants
in the ordinary course of life; that the doctrine of survivorship, as applied to tenancies by the entireties, does not include within its contemplation a survivorship which arises
by a wrongful, illegal homicide, committed by such survivor
who, and those under him, may claim all the entirety estate.
If this be true, when H killed -W, he violated the condition
upon which, under the fiction of the legal unity of husband
and wife, he would ordinarily have been entitled to hold and
enjoy the entire estate, free from participation by his wife,
and forever barred the possibility of his being, in the light
of the law, the legal survivor of W. As a result of H'8 felonious act, this right of freedom from participation, whether
we denominate it as an equitable interest or not, and to
which H would have been entitled if he had legally survived
TV, descended to V's heirs, while the legal title passed to or
remained in H, who now has a vested interest in at least
one-half of the rents and profits for life, and the bare legal
title, subject to an equitable remainder in fee in the heirs
of TV. On the basis of such interest, the heirs of WV may institute a suit in equity, praying:
(1) That H be restrained from conveying the bare legal
title to bona fide purchasers for value and without notice;
(2) That H be declared constructive trustee of the
wife's interest or right of participation, however described,
for her heirs;
(3) That upon H's death, the legal title held by H, subject to the equitable remainder in fee in favor of W's children, be adjudged to pass by the decree to such children or
heirs.
Such a theory gives full recognition to the nature of the
common-law theory of estates by entireties, prevents the
murderer from profiting by his wrong, gives full effect to
his vested rights, and assumes that the descent of estates is
cast immediately upon the owner's death.
The second case, Santouria.'s Estate,28 1 dealt with a
283- 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925), 26 COL. L. Iv.
482 (1926).
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joint tenancy which in some respects is analogous to tenancy
by the entirety. The facts in this case were: In February,
1923, W opened an account in the X Bank in Troy in her
individual name which continued until May 12, 1924, when
the sum of $399.20, the total deposit, was withdrawn and a
new account in the same bank opened in the name of 1"W and
H, either to draw or the survivor." After certain deposits
and withdrawals, on June 1, 1925, there remained to the joint
credit of TV and H, the sum of $306.27.
-OnJune 12, 1925, W was killed by her husband H, who
pleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree,
and was sentenced to prison for a term of not less than
twenty years nor more than the rest of his natural life. The
administrator of W instituted his proceeding under Section
205 of the Surrogate's Court Act to compel the delivery of
the bank deposit, joining the X Bank and H as defendants.
The bank answered and the only question was:
Whether or not this fund should be paid over to the
petitioning administrator or remain in the bank as the property of H? The Banking Law 282 provided:
When a deposit shall be made by any person in the names of
such depositor and another person and in the form to be paid to
either or the survivor of them, such deposit and any additions thereto
made by either of such persons after the making thereof, shall become
the property of such persons as joint tenants, and the same together
with all dividends thereon shall be held for the exclusive use of such
persons and may be paid to either during the lifetime of both or to
the survivor after the death of one of them .... The making of the

deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which
either such savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the
intention of both depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such survivor.
The court, after referring to the general doctrine of
88 and after admitting that under the BankBiggs v. Palmer,9
ing Law, H "had title prior to his wife's death, as well as
after," nevertheless gave a decree for the plaintiff, holding
282N.
283

Y.

BANKING LAW

See note 275 .supra.

§ 249(3).
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that the deposit should be turned over to the administrator
of WT,to pay the funeral expenses, and the balance to be devoted to the support of the child.
8
The decision in this case, as in Van Alstyne v. Tuffy2 4
which involved an estate by the entirety, which, to some extent, is analogous to the joint estate here involved, entirely
overlooked the fact that the murderer in each case had a
vested interest. If this be so, then the holding of the court
in effect declares a forfeiture of this property as an additional punishment for crime, which, of course, is prohibited
by the New York Constitution. 28 5 Such 'a view has been
taken as to dower by North Carolina; as to estates by the
entireties by North Carolina, Missouri and Tennessee.286
Under the doctrine as thus developed, the vested interest
of H, the murderer, cannot be taken from him even by a
court of equity. But by his crime H has taken away W's
vested interest in one-half of the land, and a contingent right
to the whole upon surviving his co-tenant, which, giving
proper effect to the theory of joint tenancies, W was entitled
to, and therefore H must hold such interest as constructive
trustee for the heir of W. By reason of H's wrongful conduct, the contingent interest to which W was entitled in the
event of survivorship, was not destroyed; an equitable interest in remainder in fee descended upon W's death to her
heirs or legal representatives, the bare legal title passing to
H to prevent a forfeiture of H's vested interest in a moiety
of the land, but subject, nevertheless, upon H's death to the
equitable remainder in fee in favor of W's heirs.
No such reasoning is suggested by the court. Instead,
clinging to what it blindly terms its rule of public policy, the
court held that in the Van Alstyne case, involving an estate
by the entirety, and in In re Santourian'sEstate18 7 involving a joint tenancy, all rights were forfeited in their respective tenancies. Such holdings have not been passed upon
284
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216 Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888); Beddingfield v.
Estill & Newman, 178 Tenn. 393, 100 S. W. 108 (1907); Bryant v. Bryant,
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(Mo. 1930).
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by the New York Court of Appeals, and both seem to be open
to the constitutional objection of taking property without
due process of law.
XI.

DEPORTATION OF ALIEN As AMOUNTING To BILL

OF ATTAINDER

This brings us to the latest case, United States v.
Reimer,28 8 which was decided in

1938, and arose in the

Southern District Court of New York. A federal statute
authorized the deportation of an alien who at any time after
entering the United States was found to have secured a
preference-quota visa through fraud, by contracting a marriage which, subsequent to entry, had been annulled retroactively to the date of marriage, or where the alien failed
28 9
to fulfill his promise of marriage to procure his entry.
The petitioner was in the latter situation and sought a writ of
habeas corpus to secure his release after the Commissioner
of Immigration had ordered his deportation, on the theory
that the statute was unconstitutional, as amounting to a bill
of attainder or involved an ex post facto law. As to the first
contention, the court held that a statute providing for deportation of an alien, after an administrative hearing, was
not unconstitutional for failure to provide a judicial trial
and as amounting to a bill of attainder. Nor was it void as
an ex post facto law, as Article I, Section 1, has no application to purely civil proceedings.
XII.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it appears that the spirit of attainder,
forfeiture and corruption of blood has been present in New
York from the early colonial period up to the present time.
The act abolishing forfeitures in 1683 290 was a step in the
opposite direction, but the first treason statute of 1691 291
followed almost immediately by the attainder and execution
of Jacob Leisler and James Milbourne in the same year, set
28822 F. Supp. 573 (S. D.
28950 STAT. 165 (1937), 8
290 See note 2 s=pra.
291 See note 4 supra.

N. Y. 1938).
U. S. C. § 213(a) (1946).
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off a series of developments which, in one form or another,
have continued and have profound significance today. Following the Leisler trial comes the King v. Legget case in
1696,292 the treason trial of King v. Bayard in 1702,293 and
finally, on the very eve of the American Revolution, the proposed attainder of Ethan Allen 2 94 by New York's Royal
Governor, Lord Tryon,2 94 who, himself, was subsequently
attainted by the Colonial Legislature, over which he formerly reigned. 295 This event marked the end of colonial
developments.
In the next period-from the Declaration of Independence to the Treaty of Peace in 1783-the spirit of attainder
ran riot, resulting in approximately 60 statutory enactments
by the colonial, provincial or state legislature, reaching a
climax in the Attainder Act of October 22, 1779,296 under
which fifty-nine New York citizens of great prominence and
property were attainted with a consequent forfeiture of their
real and personal estates. Among those specifically named
in the statute were John Murray, Earl of Deermore, formerly Governor of the Colony of New York, the late Governor William Tryon, Oliver De Lancey, late Member of the
Colonial Council, George Duncan Ludlow and Thomas
Jones, late Justices of the Supreme Court, John Tabor
Kempe, late Attorney-General, and many others. A semiclimax was reached in this period in the enactment of the
famous Trespass Act of March 4, 1783,297 which, as we have
seen, produced the Rutgers v. Waddington2 9 case during the
following year.
During the period between 1783 and the adoption of the
Constitution in 1789, and extending up to 1813, the state
legislature enacted approximately forty-eight additional
pieces of legislation dealing directly or collaterally with
292
293

See note 21 supra.

See note 36 supra.

294 See the Act entitled, "Act for preventing tumultuous and riotous Assem-

blies in the Places therein mentioned, and for the most speedy and effectual
punishment of the Rioters." 5 Colonial Laws of New York 647-655 (1894).
See also ante p. 13 et seq.
295 See note 83 supra.
296 Ibid.
297 See note 112 supra.
298 See note 129 supra.
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various phases of the problems growing out of the established policy of attainder and confiscation.
The climax of this period was reached with the passage
of the Attainder Act of May 12, 1784,299 which was designed

to immediately convert into money the goods, chattels, lands
and tenements, vested in the people of New York under this
policy. This development was followed almost immediately
by the decision of Rutgers v. Waddington3 0 0 which threatened a renewal of the conflict, raised complex national and
international issues of great significance, and left a continuing problem for future students of constitutional law as to
its effect on the history of judicial review.
The period between 1789 and 1830 was filled with English and New York decisions having mainly to do with the
rights of English and New York citizens under the statutes
of the state, as presumably modified by the provisions of the
Treaty of Peace of 1783. These decisions were interspersed
by a series of related statutes, among which were the Act of
Abolishing Forfeitures and Corruption of Blood in 1796; 301
the Act Barring Actions as to Forfeited Estates in 1797; 302
the Act for Discovery of Forfeited Lands in 1803,303 and

finally the Act Abolishing Writs of Attaint Upon Untrue
Verdicts in 1813.304

This last Act is of peculiar interest as

its repeal presupposes the prior use of the writ of attaint
as a method of controlling the jury, although the writer has
been unable to discover a single example of its use in a
specific case.
Thus the barbarous policy of attainder and confiscation, which began with the Attainder Act of 1779 105 after a
period of fifty-one years, had now run its course, leaving
in its wake a land filled with civil strife, a land in which
prosperous homes had been destroyed, with separation of
men, women and children who had occupied these homes and
pursued gainful occupations. In many cases the children
299

See note 125 supra.

30oSee note 129 supra.

301 See
302 See
303 See
304 See
305 See

note
note
note
note
note

197 supra.
198 supra.
205 supra.
206 supra.
83 supra.
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were apprenticed out in what was in effect but a form of
human slavery.
During this period Flick 3 06 estimates that approximately thirty-five thousand residents of the Province of New
York were driven out and forced to settle in Nova Scotia
and Upper Canada. As to property, the same authority
concludes 307 that these former citizens of New York sacrificed or lost some $40,000,000 worth of property.
These figures, at best, are very rough estimates as to
the loss to the state in resources, of population and property. What the losses were in terms of cultural and spiritual
value will never be known, but any impartial investigator
of this period must conclude that they were tremendous.
And last, but perhaps not least, the animosities, bitterness
and hatred, engendered among those forced to flee to Canada,
have resulted in repercussions which may still be heard
among the descendants of those loyalists who once were
proud to claim New York citizenship.
The period between 1830 and the close of the Civil War
was the one period during which the spirit of attainder was
most quiescent, although there were two cases 308 in which
the issue was broached.
As a result of the Civil War we were faced with that
series of decisions known as the test-oath cases, of which the
New York case of Green v. Shumway,309 decided in 1868,
was somewhat typical.
In 1888, Avery v. Everett 310 raised the issue of attainder
and civil death; in the same year in Hawker v. New York,311
conviction of crime as a bar to the practice of a profession,
was urged as amounting to attainder. In 1889, in Riggs v.
312
Pamer,
in 1896, in Ellerson v. Westoott 3 13 in 1918, in
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,3 1 4 and in 1925, in In re Santourns
306 See note 184 supra.
307

308

Ibid.

Hartung v. The People of the State of New York, 22 N. Y. 95 (1860);
Shepherd v. The People of the State of New York, 25 N. Y. 406 (1862).
309 See note 249 supra.
310 See note 254 supra.
311 See note 264 supra.
312 See note 283 supra.
313 See note 271 supra.
314 See note 280 supra.
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Estate, 15 attainder, as applied to persons killing in order to
profit, was in issue.
Finally, in 1938, in a case arising in New York, but decided in the United States District Court-UnitedStates v.
Riemer 31 6-- it was argued that the deportation of an alien
amounted to a bill of attainder.
Tie this long train of events in the single state of New
York up to the decision of Lovett v. United States,317 in
which, one hundred and fifty-eight years after attainder was
outlawed as to both state and nation, the Supreme Court was
called upon to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional
as amounting to a bill of attainder, and it becomes evident
how very, very thin and shadowy is the line, which even at
this late date, separates liberty from tyranny.
ALISON RDPPY.

See note 287 supra.
See note 288 supra.
317 328 U. S. 303, 90 L. ed. 1252 (1946).
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